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sources, including ditches. Hence, accepting EPIC's allegatio-as as
true, the district court held the Lumber Companies discharged
pollutants from a point source.
Next at issue was whether the CWA exempted the Lumber
Companies' discharges as a storm water discharge. Although the CWA
requires permits for discharges from point sources, section 402 of the
CWA exempts discharges comprised entirely of storm water. The
district court applied a two-part inquiry in determining whether the
storm water exception applied. First, the court addressed whether the
Lumber Companies' discharges were comprised entirely of storm
water. In its complaint, EPIC asserted that the Lumber Companies
used culverts and drainage ditches to discharge storm water and
pollutants. Hence, accepting as true all allegations in the complaint,
the court concluded the Lumber Companies were not exempt from
NPDES permit requirements because the discharges were not
comprised entirely of storm water.
Secondly, the court addressed whether the Lumber Companies'
In 1987, EPA passed
discharges were currently unregulated.
regulations authorizing states and the EPA to continue to regulate
exempt storm water discharges on a case-by-case basis. Additionally,
the CWA expressly regulates point source discharges. Hence, the
Lumber Companies discharges were not exempt from the NPDES
permitting requirement because the CWA regulates point source
discharges.
Accordingly, the court denied the Lumber Companies' motion to
dismiss because the Lumber Companies discharged storm water and
pollution from a point source, the discharges were not exempt as
storm water because they were not comprised entirely of storm water,
and the CWA regulates point source discharges.
HeatherK Chamberlain

North Carolina Shellfish Growers Ass'n v. Holly Ridge Assocs., No.
7:01-CV-36-BO(3), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13676 (E.D.N.C. July 25,
2003) (granting representational standing for organizations to pursue
Clean Water Act citizen suit claims in federal court; holding that
disputed ditches, wetlands and other waters were subject to Clean
Water Act jurisdiction; that stormwater and sediment discharged into
jurisdictional waters from point sources were pollutants, and therefore
subject to permitting under the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System; and reserving judgment on whether fecal coliform
bacteria constituted a pollutant under the Clean Water Act).
The North Carolina Coastal Federation ("NCCF") and North
Carolina Shellfish Growers Association ("NCSGA") filed a Clean Water
Act ("CWA") citizen suit for violations of sections 402 and 404 of the
CWA caused by ditching and excavation activities on a 1,262-acre tract
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of land located in Onslow County, North Carolina. Holly Ridge
Associates and John A. Elmore (collectively "HRA") owned the tract,
which bordered Stump Sound and the Atlantic Intracoastal
Waterway-navigable waters used for commercial shellfishing and
recreational activities. Between January and November 1998, HRA
constructed and expanded ditches through 34.2 acres of wetlands and
uplands adjacent to wetlands causing a discharge of sediment and
other pollutants, including fecal coliform bacteria, into the
surrounding waters. HRA did not obtain CWA permits for any
discharges of pollutants from point sources, including stormwater and
fill material.
First, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina examined whether NCCF and NCSGA satisfied the
three legal elements for representational standing. An organization
can establish representational standing when (1) at least one of its
members has individual standing, (2) the organization seeks to protect
interests germane to its purpose, and (3) neither the claim asserted
nor the relief sought requires the participation of individual members.
In this case, both parties agreed that NCCF and NCSGA already
satisfied the second and third elements for representational standing.
Therefore, the court focused solely on whether NCCF's and NCSGA's
members fulfilled the requirements for individual standing.
Individual standing requires proof of a concrete, particularized,
and actual or imminent injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the
challenged action and likely to be redressable by a favorable decision.
In the environmental litigation context, the injury in fact element is
satisfied when one or more members of an organization can prove
they live, work, and recreate in the affected area and the challenged
activity would diminish their use and enjoyment of that area.
Threatened injury can be adequate for standing. In this case, the
declarations of individual members clearly established that the impact
on water quality due to the ditching activities impacted their ability
and enjoyment to boat, fish, shellfish, wade, and view wildlife in the
area at issue. Further, diminished water quality threatened the
economic and property interests of those members who retained
shellfishing leases in the Stump Sound area.
The court next analyzed whether the alleged injuries were
traceable to HRA's actions. NCCF and NCSGA only needed to prove
the types of pollutants discharged from the tract were likely to
contribute to the kinds of injuries alleged, but not that HRA's actual
conduct caused the injuries. HRA asserted that NCCF's and NCSGA's
claims of closed shellfishing waters due to increased fecal coliform
bacteria discharged from the tract were completely speculative because
sediment and other pollutants from the tract could not reach the
waters of Stump Sound. Despite HRA's contentions, the court found
the requisite nexus between HRA's actions and the increased
pollutants in the waters.
For relief, NCCF and NCSGA asked the court to impose civil
penalties, to compel HRA to remove poorly maintained fill material on
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the land, and to require HRA to obtain the necessary CWA permits for
discharging stormwater and fill material. The court found that since
there was proof of traceability between the injuries and the ditching
activities, a favorable outcome would redress NCCF's and NCSGA's
requests for relief. Therefore, both organizations satisfied the final
component to individual standing.
The court granted the
organizations representational standing to pursue their claims.
The court next addressed whether HRA's offer of judgment
impeded Congress' intentions. Under the CWA, any citizen can
commence an action for alleged violations of the CWA. Offers of
judgment require a plaintiff to accept the offer within ten days or risk
paying litigation costs incurred by defendants if the outcome is less
favorable than the offer. Since plaintiffs in CWA citizen suits are not
eligible for personal redress, forcing a citizen suit plaintiff to choose
between accepting an "unacceptable" offer and continuing the
litigation with the hope of a more favorable judgment would violate
the substantive and procedural rights of CWA citizen suits.
Finally, the court addressed issues of liability and concluded that
(1) the various waters on and adjacent to the tract are by definition
"waters of the United States" and subject to the jurisdiction of the
CWA; (2) HRA discharged pollutants, including stormwater and
sediment, into jurisdictional waters; and (3) the discharges derived
from point sources and were subject to a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System ("NPDES") permit. The court denied ruling on
whether fecal coliform bacteria constituted a pollutant under the CWA
due to conflicting testimonies from different experts.
On NCCF's and NCSGA's first argument related to liability, the
court found that all waters at issue were subject to jurisdiction under
the CWA. Stump Sound and Batts Mill Creek fell under the United
States Army Corps of Engineers' definition of navigable waters, and
the tributaries, man-made ditches, and man-made lake in question
were all "hydrologically connected" to jurisdictional waters under the
CWA.
HRA disputed whether Cypress Branch was a tributary of Batts Mill
Creek, arguing that the creek ended in a wide wetland flat which
would abate any channelized surface flow coming from the stream.
However, the court held that since intermittent surface flow from
episodic storm events was sufficient to carry pollutants to connected
jurisdictional tributaries and navigable waters, the hydrological
connection existed.
Next, the court looked to the Supreme Court's analysis in Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Carps of
Engineers ("SWANCC") in examining wetlands on the tract of land not
immediately adjacent to navigable waters. In previous decisions, courts
applied two different interpretations of SWANCC. Some courts found
the ruling limited CWA jurisdiction to only those waters that were
navigable or adjacent to open bodies of navigable water. The other
interpretation, used by this court, contended that SWANCC applied
only to isolated waters lacking any hydrologic connection to navigable
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waters or tributaries of navigable waters.
Using this interpretation, the court found that wetlands on the
tract were not isolated, but formed a "continuous, hydrologically
connected network" with Cypress Branch and any ditches adjacent to
the wetlands. Any pollutants discharged from the wetlands continued
to pose a threat to the quality of all jurisdictional waters downstream of
that system. Thus, the court found that all wetlands on the tract, even
those not directly adjacent to Stump Sound, were subject to CWA
jurisdiction.
The court then considered whether certain HRA discharges were
"pollutants" under the CWA, which would be prohibited without an
NPDES permit. The CWA defines sediment, composed primarily of
sand and silt, as a pollutant. Evidence and testimony offered by NCCF
and NCSGA confirmed discharges of sediment from the ditches on the
tract into waters of the United States. Moreover, undisputed evidence
demonstrated that improper construction and maintenance of ditches
and spoil piles caused massive erosion of silt, sand and sediment into
wetlands, tributaries and streams both on and adjacent to the tract.
The CWA also defines biological material, including fecal coliform
bacteria, as a pollutant. NCCF and NCSGA contended that the ditches
on the tract altered the landscape to the extent that fecal coliform
bacteria from animal droppings, normally absorbed into the ground,
was instead taken up with stormwater and carried out into waters of
the United States. However, the court reserved judgment on whether
fecal coliform bacteria was a pollutant in this matter because
conflicting factual disputes warranted further discussion.
The CWA requires a permit for stormwater discharges derived
from industrial activities, including clearing, grading, and excavation
which disturbs five or more acres of land. Despite HRA's claims that
the tract was managed for forestry purposes and was therefore exempt
from the permit requirements, the court found that because HRA's
activities disturbed over 34.2 acres, the ditching qualified as industrial
activity. Therefore, stormwater conveyed from these ditches qualified
as a pollutant under the CWA.
NCCF and NCSGA then argued that the ditches, sediment traps,
gullies and rills, and the tract itself were in fact point sources under
the CWA. The court agreed with the organizations, finding that
ditches fell under the CWA's definition of point sources; sediment
traps failed to confine further sediment deposits, and therefore
contributed to the sediment problem; and that gullies and rills
accelerated the movement of sediment through the ditches.
Moreover, the court held the site itself constituted a point source
because the entire tract required an NPDES permit for the ditching
activities involving more than five acres.
Furthermore, section 404 of the CWA governs the discharge of fill
material that alters the bottom elevation of any jurisdictional water.
Here, NCCF and NCSGA alleged that the rock check dams
constructed in several of the ditches constituted "fill material" and
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affected the bottom elevation of those ditches. HRA maintained that
the check dams fell under the silvicultural exemption of section 404,
which allowed the discharge of fill material from "plowing, seeding,
The
cultivating, [and] minor drainage" without regulation.
exemption however, included a recapture provision requiring a permit
for discharges of fill material designed to alter or bring the area to new
use. NCCF and NCSGA claimed the network of ditches were beyond
the definition of "minor drainage," and specifically created for
converting wetland to non-wetland. The court refused to determine
whether the silvicultural exemption applied under section 404 due to
However, because undisputed
the conflicting factual disputes.
evidence proved discharges of fill material into waters of the United
States, NCCF and NCSGA could obtain a determination of liability for
HRA's underlying violation of CWA section 404.
DaraLur

North Dakota v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. Al-03-50,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12072 (D.N.D. July 14, 2003) (finding that a
high probability of failure on the merits and lack of greater public
interest precluded the court from issuing a preliminary injunction for
water level control in reservoirs regardless of possible irreparable
harm).
The State of South Dakota moved for a preliminary injunction to
prevent the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") from
lowering the water level of the reservoirs in South Dakota. The
procedural events preceding South Dakota's motion began with North
Dakota filing a complaint in North Dakota state district court on April
29, 2003. The State of North Dakota alleged that the Corps violated
North Dakota's water quality standards through its operation of
Garrison Dam. The parties removed the case to the United States
District Court for the District of North Dakota, Southwestern Division,
and the States of Nebraska and South Dakota intervened. South
Dakota then filed a separate complaint. South Dakota alleged that
judicial estoppel prohibited the Corps from reducing water levels on
mainstream reservoirs to support navigation, that lowering the water
level was contrary to the Flood Control Act of 1944, and that the
Corps' actions were in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.
A hearing on June 4, 2003, determined both North Dakota's and
South Dakota's Motions for Preliminary Injunctions.
In evaluating the Motions for Preliminary Injunction, the court
evaluated four factors: (1) the movant's probability of success, (2) the
threat of irreparable harm to the movant absent injunction, (3) the
balance between the harm to the movant and the injury on other
interested parties, and (4) public interest. The burden of proving
these factors is on the moving party.
The court held that South Dakota was not likely to succeed on the

